Alibaba Cloud (Aliyun)

The cloud your other tools don't cover.

Alibaba Cloud is a real blind spot for most enterprises: the big Western cost and CSPM tools under-serve it, so waste and misconfiguration accumulate unwatched, often in the China-region estate nobody else is scanning.

Nuvozy gives Alibaba first-class coverage, ECS, OSS, RDS, SLB/ALB, VPC, RAM, KMS, Security Center, and ACR, with a heavy emphasis on security posture, so the cloud your incumbents ignore finally gets a read-only second opinion.

Underserved

Few cost or CSPM tools cover Alibaba Cloud at all, so this is often the first real visibility a team gets into it.

Security-heavy

A security-first detector set: RAM hygiene, OSS exposure, Security Center gaps, and KMS posture.

Same pass

Idle ECS, unused SLB/ALB, and orphaned disks priced alongside the security findings, one scan, one report.

What we scan on Alibaba Cloud

A representative sample of the Alibaba Cloud checks, grouped by service domain. Cost waste and security risk are surfaced in the same read-only pass. The complete, searchable list is further down this page.

Compute & storage

ECS, OSS, block storage, serverless, ACR.

Idle & oversized ECS instances

Compute running with little or no real load.

OSS bucket exposure & lifecycle

Public buckets and cold data on hot-tier pricing.

Orphaned disks & snapshots

Block storage left behind by deleted instances.

Serverless & container registry waste

Function and ACR resources nobody uses.

Database & messaging

RDS, NoSQL, Kafka, Elasticsearch, messaging.

Idle RDS instances

Managed databases with near-zero activity.

NoSQL & Elasticsearch over-provisioning

Capacity sized well above consumption.

Kafka & messaging idle

Streaming and queue resources with no throughput.

Network

VPC, SLB/ALB, EIP, peering, cloud firewall.

Idle SLB / ALB load balancers

Balancers with no targets or traffic.

Unused EIPs & VPC plumbing

Reserved addresses and peering carrying nothing.

Edge & CDN waste

Distributions and edge resources serving no requests.

Security & identity

RAM, KMS, Security Center, audit, cloud firewall.

RAM identity & policy hygiene

Over-broad permissions and stale users/keys.

OSS public exposure

Object storage open beyond intent.

Security Center & audit gaps

Detective controls left disabled.

KMS & cloud-firewall posture

Key rotation and perimeter configuration.

Every check we run on Alibaba Cloud

All 183 checks, generated directly from the scanner so this list matches what actually runs. Search for a service to see whether your stack is covered.

  • Commitment

    Steady fleet with no reserved instances

    A region runs many long-lived pay-as-you-go ECS instances but holds no reserved instances. A commitment-discount opportunity.

  • Commitment

    Underutilized reserved instance

    An active reserved instance covers an instance type with no matching running ECS instance in the region. The commitment is being wasted.

  • Compute

    ACK node pool without autoscaling

    ACK node pools with autoscaling disabled and a large fixed node count. Enabling the cluster autoscaler lets the pool scale in during low demand and stop paying for idle nodes.

  • Compute uses metrics

    Idle ECS instances (low CPU)

    Running ECS instances averaging under 5% CPU (peak under 20%) over the lookback window. Release or stop candidates.

  • Compute

    Long-running non-prod ECI container group

    Non-production ECI container groups that have been Running for a week or more. ECI is billed per second for the lifetime of the group, so a forgotten dev/test pod quietly accrues cost.

  • Compute

    Non-prod ECS not using preemptible

    Non-production running instances using on-demand billing (SpotStrategy NoSpot). Preemptible (spot) instances cost far less for interruptible non-prod workloads.

  • Compute

    Non-prod GPU instance

    Non-production instances with a GPU attached. GPU instances are expensive and rarely need to stay powered for non-prod use.

  • Compute uses metrics

    Over-provisioned ECS instances

    Running ECS instances averaging 5-20% CPU with peaks under 50%. Candidates to downsize one instance tier.

  • Compute

    Previous-generation ECS family

    ECS instances on a previous-generation family. The current-gen equivalent delivers more performance for a lower hourly rate.

  • Compute

    Stopped ECS instances still billing

    ECS instances that are Stopped but kept in KeepCharging mode, so they bill full compute while doing nothing.

  • Database

    AnalyticDB on previous-gen node class

    AnalyticDB (ADB) clusters running on a previous-generation node class. Current elastic generations deliver better price/performance for the same spend.

  • Database uses metrics

    Idle RDS instances

    Running RDS instances averaging under 5% CPU over the lookback window. Idle databases that can be downsized or retired.

  • Database uses metrics

    Idle Redis instances

    Redis (KVStore) instances averaging under 2% CPU and under 5% memory use over the lookback window. Idle caches.

  • Database

    MongoDB on previous-gen class

    ApsaraDB for MongoDB (DDS) instances on a previous-generation instance class; current-gen classes offer better price/performance.

  • Database uses metrics

    Over-provisioned RDS instances

    Running RDS instances averaging 5-25% CPU with peaks under 50%. Candidates to downsize one instance class.

  • Database uses metrics

    Over-provisioned Redis instances

    Redis (KVStore) instances using under 30% of memory (peak under 50%). Candidates to downsize to a smaller memory class.

  • Database

    Oversized non-prod Elasticsearch

    A non-production-looking Elasticsearch instance runs a large number of nodes, which is usually unnecessary outside production (informational).

  • Database

    PolarDB on previous-gen node class

    PolarDB clusters running on a previous-generation node class. Current generations deliver more performance per dollar for the same spend.

  • Database

    Previous-generation RDS instance class

    ApsaraDB RDS instances on a previous-generation (legacy ``rds.<engine>.s*``) instance class. Current-gen general/dedicated classes deliver more performance per dollar.

  • Database

    Production RDS without multi-AZ

    Production ApsaraDB RDS instances on the Basic (single-AZ) category, which has no standby for automatic failover.

  • Database

    Redis on previous-gen class

    ApsaraDB for Redis (KVStore) instances on a previous-generation instance class; Tair / current-gen classes offer better value.

  • Database

    Single-node production Elasticsearch

    A production-looking Elasticsearch instance has a single node, so it has no high availability. A node failure means an outage and possible data loss.

  • Governance

    ACK cluster on an old Kubernetes version

    ACK clusters running a Kubernetes minor version below the supported window. Old versions miss security fixes and block cluster upgrades.

  • Governance

    ACK cluster without API audit logging

    ACK clusters with Kubernetes API-server audit logging to SLS disabled, so privileged control-plane actions are not recorded.

  • Governance

    ALB without access logging

    Application Load Balancers with access logging to SLS not enabled, so there is no request-level audit trail of the traffic they route.

  • Governance

    API Gateway group without throttling

    An API group exposes published APIs but the region has no traffic-control (throttling) policy, leaving the backend unprotected from request floods.

  • Governance

    AnalyticDB cluster without backups

    AnalyticDB (ADB) clusters with a backup retention period of 0 days (or no backup policy at all). No point-in-time recovery after data loss or corruption.

  • Governance

    CLB without access logging

    Classic Load Balancers with access logging not configured, so there is no request-level audit trail of the traffic they route.

  • Governance

    Cloud disk without automatic snapshots

    In-use cloud disks with no auto-snapshot policy. There is no automated backup, so data loss from accidental deletion or corruption is unrecoverable.

  • Governance

    DTS job failed

    A Data Transmission Service (DTS) job is in a failed/error state, so the migration or synchronization it drives is not running.

  • Governance

    Default VPC present

    A default VPC exists in the account/region. Default VPCs ship with permissive defaults and are easy to deploy into by accident.

  • Governance

    Disabled KMS key

    KMS keys in the Disabled state. A disabled key can decrypt nothing and is usually a leftover that should be cleaned up or re-enabled.

  • Governance

    ECS on legacy classic network

    ECS instances on the legacy classic network rather than a VPC, which lacks VPC isolation, security, and feature support.

  • Governance

    Elasticsearch on EOL version

    An Elasticsearch instance runs a major version at or below 6.x, which is end-of-life and no longer receiving security fixes upstream.

  • Governance

    Empty RocketMQ instance

    A RocketMQ instance has no topics defined, so it carries no workload. A cleanup candidate.

  • Governance

    FC function on a deprecated runtime

    Function Compute functions running on an end-of-life language runtime (old Node.js / Python / Java). Deprecated runtimes stop receiving security patches and eventually block new deployments.

  • Governance

    Idle DTS job not released

    A DTS job has finished or been paused but the job (and any paid DTS instance behind it) has not been released.

  • Governance

    Idle Kafka instance (no topics)

    Running Message Queue for Kafka instances with no topics configured. The cluster bills while sitting completely unused.

  • Governance

    Idle RocketMQ topic

    A RocketMQ topic has no subscribed consumer groups, so nothing is consuming from it. An idle cleanup candidate.

  • Governance

    Idle Tablestore instance (no tables)

    Tablestore (OTS) instances with zero tables. An empty instance serves no traffic and is usually a leftover that can be cleaned up.

  • Governance

    Inactive RAM user

    Console-enabled RAM users created 90+ days ago that have never logged in. Stale identities widen the attack surface and should be removed.

  • Governance

    Instance missing owner tag

    An ECS instance has no owner or environment tag, so it cannot be attributed to a responsible team or lifecycle stage.

  • Governance

    Low resource tag coverage

    A large fraction of ECS instances and cloud disks carry no tags. Untagged resources cannot be attributed to a team or cost center, leaving a cost-allocation and governance gap.

  • Governance

    MNS queue without a dead-letter queue

    An MNS queue has no dead-letter target configured, so messages that repeatedly fail processing are dropped rather than quarantined.

  • Governance

    MongoDB on an old engine version

    ApsaraDB for MongoDB (DDS) instances on an engine version below 4.0, which is past end-of-life and misses security and performance fixes.

  • Governance

    MongoDB without audit log

    ApsaraDB for MongoDB (DDS) instances with audit logging disabled, so there is no record of access to the database.

  • Governance

    MongoDB without automated backup

    ApsaraDB for MongoDB (DDS) instances with no automated backup policy (no retention or backup window configured), leaving the data with no recovery point.

  • Governance

    No Bastionhost despite an ECS fleet

    The account runs many ECS instances but operates no Bastionhost, so privileged access to the fleet is not centrally brokered or audited.

  • Governance

    Non-prod AnalyticDB cluster running

    AnalyticDB (ADB) clusters whose name/tags mark them as non-production (dev/test/staging) yet are running. ADB clusters bill while up. Pause or clean up idle non-prod warehouses.

  • Governance

    Non-prod ECS running 24/7

    Non-production instances left in the Running state continuously. They are strong candidates for a stop/start schedule to save off-hours cost.

  • Governance

    OSS bucket without access logging

    OSS buckets with access logging disabled, leaving no audit trail of who accessed the bucket's objects.

  • Governance

    OSS bucket without versioning

    OSS buckets with versioning not Enabled (never enabled or suspended), leaving objects unprotected against accidental overwrite or deletion.

  • Governance

    Offline CDN domain

    CDN domains in an offline or configuring/failed state. Not serving traffic but still provisioned. Candidates for cleanup.

  • Governance

    Oversized VPC CIDR

    A VPC reserves a very large CIDR block (short prefix). Oversized ranges waste address space and complicate future peering/CIDR plans.

  • Governance

    PolarDB cluster without deletion lock

    PolarDB clusters that do not have the deletion lock enabled, so a single accidental API call or console action can destroy the cluster.

  • Governance

    PolarDB with insufficient backup retention

    PolarDB clusters whose level-1 (data) backup retention is below a safe minimum, shrinking the recovery window after data loss or corruption.

  • Governance

    Prod ECS without deletion protection

    Production-looking ECS instances with DeletionProtection disabled, so they can be released by an accidental API/console call.

  • Governance

    RDS backups disabled

    ApsaraDB RDS instances with a backup retention period of 0 days or log (binlog) backup turned off. No point-in-time recovery.

  • Governance

    RDS deletion protection disabled

    Production ApsaraDB RDS instances with deletion protection turned off, so the database can be deleted with a single API call.

  • Governance

    RDS end-of-life engine version

    ApsaraDB RDS instances on an end-of-life engine version (MySQL 5.5/5.6, PostgreSQL < 11, or an out-of-support SQL Server) that no longer receives security patches.

  • Governance

    RDS without SQL audit

    ApsaraDB RDS instances with the SQL audit (SQL collector) policy turned off, so there is no audit trail of the queries run against the database.

  • Governance

    RDS without log (binlog) backup

    ApsaraDB RDS instances with log (binlog) backup disabled, so point-in-time recovery is impossible and only full snapshots remain.

  • Governance

    Redis without audit log

    ApsaraDB for Redis (Tair/KVStore) instances with the audit log feature disabled, so there is no record of the commands run against the cache.

  • Governance

    Repository without immutable tags

    A Container Registry repository does not enforce tag immutability, so an existing tag can be overwritten with a different image.

  • Governance

    Reserved instance expiring soon

    An active reserved instance expires within 30 days. Without renewal the covered workload reverts to pay-as-you-go pricing.

  • Governance

    Reserved instance recently expired

    A reserved instance expired within the last 30 days. Any workload it covered is now billing at pay-as-you-go rates. A coverage gap.

  • Governance

    SLS Logstore short retention

    A Logstore retains logs for fewer than 7 days. Short retention drops history before incident response or audits can use it.

  • Governance

    SLS Logstore without an index

    A Logstore has no index, so its logs cannot be queried or used for search-based alerting. Limiting audit and investigation value.

  • Governance

    Snapshots without a retention limit

    Manually created snapshots with no retention period. They are kept until deleted by hand, so storage cost grows unbounded over time.

  • Governance

    Stale API Gateway group

    An API group has no published APIs. Empty groups still reserve a sub-domain and clutter the gateway; they should be cleaned up.

  • Governance

    Stale FC function

    Function Compute functions not modified in 180+ days. Long-untouched functions are frequently abandoned and worth reviewing for cleanup.

  • Governance

    Stale KMS secret

    KMS Secrets Manager secrets that have not had a new version created in over a year, a sign the secret may be abandoned and should be reviewed for removal.

  • Governance

    Stale MNS queue

    An MNS queue has no messages and has not been modified for a long time, suggesting it is abandoned (best-effort, from config only).

  • Governance

    Stale container repository

    A Container Registry repository has had no push for a long time, suggesting it is abandoned and a candidate for cleanup.

  • Governance

    Stopped Kafka instance not released

    Message Queue for Kafka instances whose service has stopped / expired but which have not been released, leaving leftover resources behind.

  • Governance

    Untagged cloud disk

    A cloud disk has zero tags, leaving its storage spend with no owner or cost-center attribution (cost-allocation gap).

  • Network

    ALB with no registered targets

    Application Load Balancers whose server groups have no registered backend servers. They bill an hourly instance fee while routing to nothing.

  • Network

    CLB with no listeners

    Classic Load Balancers with no listeners configured. They bill an hourly instance fee while unable to route any traffic.

  • Network

    Idle NAT gateways (no entries)

    NAT gateways with no SNAT and no DNAT (forward) entries configured. They bill an hourly instance fee while translating no traffic.

  • Network

    Idle load balancers (no backends)

    Server Load Balancers with no backend servers attached. They bill an hourly instance fee while routing to nothing.

  • Network uses metrics

    Idle load balancers (no traffic)

    CLB load balancers with near-zero inbound traffic and active connections over the lookback window. Idle even if a backend exists.

  • Network

    Idle pay-by-bandwidth Elastic IPs

    Pay-by-bandwidth Elastic IPs in the Available state (bound to nothing). They reserve and bill a fixed bandwidth ceiling while serving nothing.

  • Network

    NAT gateway without SNAT entries

    NAT gateways with no SNAT entries configured. No subnet uses the gateway for outbound (source) translation. Review whether it is needed.

  • Network

    Non-prod CLB on guaranteed-performance spec

    Classic Load Balancers that look non-production yet run on a guaranteed-performance spec, a pricier tier than shared performance.

  • Network

    Orphaned VPC peering connection

    VPC peering connections that exist but are not referenced by any route table entry. The peering provides no connectivity yet remains an approved cross-VPC path that should be cleaned up.

  • Network

    Oversized Elastic IP bandwidth

    Elastic IPs bound to a resource but provisioned with a very high bandwidth ceiling. Likely oversized for the bound workload.

  • Network

    Unattached Elastic IPs

    Elastic IP addresses in the Available state (bound to nothing). Pay-as-you-go EIPs bill an idle reservation fee while unattached.

  • Network

    Unattached secondary ENI

    A secondary Elastic Network Interface is in the Available state, attached to no instance. Unattached ENIs are leftover plumbing that clutter the network and hold IP addresses.

  • Network

    Unused CEN bandwidth package

    A CEN (Cloud Enterprise Network) bandwidth package is not bound to any CEN instance. It reserves cross-region bandwidth that nothing is using.

  • Network

    Unused vSwitch

    A vSwitch has its full address range available, suggesting no resources are deployed into it (best-effort, from IP accounting).

  • Network

    VPN gateway with no connections

    A VPN gateway has no IPsec connections, so it provides no connectivity while still reserving (and potentially billing for) the gateway.

  • Network

    vSwitch near IP exhaustion

    A vSwitch has very few available IP addresses remaining. New resources launched into it may fail to acquire an address.

  • Security

    ACK cluster with a public API server

    ACK (Kubernetes) clusters exposing the API server over a public internet endpoint, widening the attack surface of the control plane.

  • Security

    ACK cluster without Secret encryption

    ACK clusters that do not have KMS-backed encryption-at-rest for Kubernetes Secrets, so Secret values are stored unencrypted in etcd.

  • Security

    ACK cluster without network policy enforcement

    ACK clusters using a Flannel-based CNI, which does not enforce Kubernetes NetworkPolicy. Pod-to-pod traffic is unrestricted across the cluster, so a single compromised pod can reach every other workload.

  • Security

    ACR instance public endpoint enabled

    A Container Registry Enterprise Edition instance has its public network endpoint enabled, exposing the registry to the internet.

  • Security

    ALB HTTP listener without HTTPS redirect

    Application Load Balancers with an HTTP listener that does not redirect to HTTPS, allowing clients to keep using plaintext connections.

  • Security

    API Gateway API publicly visible on the internet

    An API has PUBLIC visibility (listed in the API marketplace) on a group served from an internet sub-domain, widening its discoverable surface.

  • Security

    API Gateway API without authentication

    An API Gateway API uses AuthType NONE (anonymous access) while its group is reachable on a public sub-domain. Anyone can call it unauthenticated.

  • Security

    AnalyticDB whitelist open to the world

    AnalyticDB clusters whose security IP whitelist contains 0.0.0.0/0, so any host on the internet can attempt to connect to the data warehouse.

  • Security

    Bastionhost with public network access

    Bastionhost instance with public network access enabled, exposing the privileged-access console to the public internet.

  • Security

    CDN domain allows plain HTTP

    CDN domains that have HTTPS available but do not force a redirect from HTTP to HTTPS, leaving an insecure plaintext path open.

  • Security

    CDN domain permitting weak TLS

    CDN domains whose HTTPS configuration still permits TLS 1.0 or 1.1, protocols with known weaknesses that modern clients should not use.

  • Security

    CDN domain without HTTPS

    CDN accelerated domains with no SSL/HTTPS configured. Traffic is served over plaintext HTTP and is open to interception.

  • Security

    CLB HTTPS listener on a weak TLS policy

    Classic Load Balancer HTTPS listeners using a TLS cipher policy that still permits TLS 1.0 or 1.1, protocols with known weaknesses.

  • Security

    Cloud Firewall accepts any port from the internet

    A Cloud Firewall internet-direction control policy accepts traffic from 0.0.0.0/0 to any port, defeating the purpose of the edge firewall.

  • Security

    Cloud Firewall default action is Accept

    The Cloud Firewall internet-traffic default action is Accept rather than a default-deny posture, so traffic not matched by an explicit policy is allowed through.

  • Security

    Cloud Firewall not enabled

    Cloud Firewall is not enabled even though the account has internet-exposed assets (public ECS, EIPs, or internet-facing SLBs), leaving north-south traffic without edge inspection.

  • Security

    DNS zone without DNSSEC

    Public DNS domains with DNSSEC disabled, leaving resolution open to cache poisoning and spoofing attacks.

  • Security

    Disabled ActionTrail trail

    An ActionTrail trail exists but its Status is Disable, so it is not delivering events even though it is configured.

  • Security

    ECS instance with public IP

    Running ECS instances with a public IP address or a bound EIP, giving them a direct attack surface on the internet.

  • Security

    ECS without instance RAM role

    ECS instances with no instance RAM role, implying applications use long-lived static AccessKeys instead of rotated instance credentials.

  • Security

    ENI without a security group

    An Elastic Network Interface has no security group attached, so its traffic is governed by no rules. An unguarded network attachment.

  • Security

    Elasticsearch HTTPS not enforced

    An Elasticsearch instance accepts plaintext HTTP rather than enforcing HTTPS, so credentials and query data travel unencrypted.

  • Security

    Elasticsearch Kibana open to the world

    Elasticsearch instances whose Kibana public-network access is enabled with a 0.0.0.0/0 whitelist, exposing the Kibana console to the internet.

  • Security

    Elasticsearch public endpoint

    An Elasticsearch instance has its public network endpoint enabled, reachable from outside the VPC.

  • Security

    FC HTTP trigger with anonymous auth

    Function Compute HTTP triggers configured with anonymous authType, so the function can be invoked over HTTP without any credentials.

  • Security

    FC function with plaintext secret env var

    Function Compute functions whose environment-variable keys look like secrets (password / token / key), suggesting credentials are stored in plaintext instead of a secret store.

  • Security

    Internet-facing ALB

    Application Load Balancers with an internet-facing address. They are reachable from the public internet and warrant WAF / access review.

  • Security

    Internet-facing CLB

    Classic Load Balancers with an internet-facing address. They are reachable from the public internet and warrant access review.

  • Security

    KMS key pending deletion

    KMS keys in the PendingDeletion state. Once deleted, every ciphertext or secret encrypted under the key becomes permanently unrecoverable.

  • Security

    KMS key without automatic rotation

    Enabled customer master keys (CMKs) with automatic rotation disabled. Rotating keys limits the blast radius of a compromised key.

  • Security

    KMS secret without automatic rotation

    KMS Secrets Manager secrets with automatic rotation disabled, so a leaked secret value stays valid until someone rotates it by hand.

  • Security

    Kafka instance with public endpoint

    Message Queue for Kafka instances deployed with an internet (public) endpoint, reachable from outside the VPC.

  • Security

    Kafka instance without ACL

    Message Queue for Kafka instances with ACL / authentication not enabled, so any client that can reach the instance on the network can read from and write to its topics.

  • Security

    Linux ECS without key pair

    Linux ECS instances with no key pair bound, implying password-based SSH authentication that is more vulnerable to brute-force attacks.

  • Security

    MongoDB without TLS

    ApsaraDB for MongoDB (DDS) instances that do not enforce TLS/SSL on client connections, so traffic and credentials travel in cleartext.

  • Security

    NAS without encryption

    NAS file systems created with encryption disabled. Data at rest is not protected by server-side encryption.

  • Security

    No ActionTrail trail

    The account has no ActionTrail trail, so management-plane API activity is not being delivered to OSS or SLS for audit and forensics.

  • Security

    No SLS project

    The account has no Log Service (SLS) project, so there is no centralized place collecting logs for auditing or investigation.

  • Security

    No custom RAM password policy

    The account has no custom RAM password policy and relies on weak defaults. Set explicit complexity, length, and rotation requirements.

  • Security

    No multi-region ActionTrail trail

    No enabled ActionTrail trail covers all regions (TrailRegion=All), so activity in some regions is unaudited even though trails exist.

  • Security

    OSS bucket not enforcing HTTPS

    OSS buckets whose bucket policy does not deny plaintext (HTTP) access, allowing objects and credentials to traverse the network unencrypted.

  • Security

    OSS bucket policy grants wildcard principal

    OSS buckets whose bucket policy has an Allow statement with a Principal of '*' and no Condition. This exposes the objects to anyone regardless of the bucket ACL, a common cause of accidental data exposure.

  • Security

    OSS bucket without default encryption

    OSS buckets that have no server-side default encryption rule, so new objects are not guaranteed to be encrypted at rest.

  • Security

    OSS bucket world-writable (public-read-write ACL)

    OSS buckets with a public-read-write ACL. Anyone on the internet can not only read every object but also overwrite or delete them and upload new ones, the single most dangerous OSS misconfiguration.

  • Security

    PolarDB without SSL

    PolarDB clusters that do not enforce SSL on their connection endpoint, so client traffic and credentials can travel unencrypted.

  • Security

    Possible dangling DNS record

    CNAME (or aliased) records pointing at cloud-provider endpoints that may have been released. A subdomain-takeover risk. Informational.

  • Security

    Public OSS buckets

    OSS buckets with a public-read or public-read-write ACL, exposing their objects to anyone on the internet.

  • Security

    Public assets without Anti-DDoS protection

    The account exposes public-facing assets (internet load balancers or public EIPs) but has no Anti-DDoS Pro/Premium instance protecting them, leaving those endpoints exposed to volumetric attacks.

  • Security

    Public container repository

    A Container Registry repository has a public repo type, so its images are pullable by anyone without authentication.

  • Security

    Public domain not protected by WAF

    A known public domain (from CDN) is not present in the set of WAF-protected domains, so its application-layer traffic is unfiltered.

  • Security

    Publicly reachable AnalyticDB cluster

    AnalyticDB (ADB) clusters with a public (Internet) connection endpoint, reachable from outside the VPC.

  • Security

    Publicly reachable MongoDB

    ApsaraDB for MongoDB (DDS) instances on the Classic network (not a VPC), reachable from outside a private network boundary.

  • Security

    Publicly reachable RDS instances

    ApsaraDB RDS instances with an Internet (public) network endpoint, reachable from outside the VPC.

  • Security

    Publicly reachable Redis

    ApsaraDB for Redis (KVStore) instances with a public (Internet) connection endpoint, reachable from outside the VPC.

  • Security

    Publicly shared custom images

    Self-owned custom images shared to all Alibaba Cloud accounts. Anyone can launch them, exposing whatever software, keys, or data they contain.

  • Security

    RAM policy grants full admin (Action * on *)

    Custom RAM policy documents with an Allow statement granting Action '*' on Resource '*', which is effectively unrestricted administrator access.

  • Security

    RAM role trust policy allows wildcard principal

    RAM roles whose assume-role (trust) policy permits a wildcard principal with no condition, so any identity that can reach the role can assume it.

  • Security

    RAM user with AdministratorAccess

    RAM users with the AdministratorAccess policy attached directly. Admin rights should be granted through groups/roles and scoped down.

  • Security

    RAM user with two active AccessKeys

    RAM users with two active AccessKeys at once. A second active key is only meant to be transient during rotation; standing pairs double the credential exposure.

  • Security

    RAM user without MFA

    RAM users with console access (a login profile) but no MFA device bound. A stolen password fully compromises the account.

  • Security

    RDS SSL/TLS disabled

    ApsaraDB RDS instances that do not enforce SSL/TLS, so client connections (and credentials) can travel in cleartext.

  • Security

    RDS public endpoint with open whitelist

    ApsaraDB RDS instances with an Internet (public) endpoint AND a 0.0.0.0/0 whitelist entry. The database is reachable and accepts connections from anywhere on the internet.

  • Security

    RDS whitelist open to the world

    ApsaraDB RDS instances whose IP whitelist contains 0.0.0.0/0, allowing connection attempts from any address.

  • Security

    RDS without Transparent Data Encryption

    ApsaraDB RDS instances with Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) disabled, so the database files are not encrypted at rest.

  • Security

    Redis without TLS

    ApsaraDB for Redis (KVStore) instances with SSL/TLS disabled, so client traffic (including the auth password) is sent in cleartext.

  • Security

    Redis without authentication

    ApsaraDB for Redis (KVStore) instances that accept connections without a password. Either classic-network instances or VPC instances with free (password-less) auth enabled.

  • Security

    SLS project policy allows broad access

    An SLS project's resource policy appears to grant broad or anonymous access (wildcard principal/action), exposing logs to unintended readers (best-effort, from the policy document).

  • Security

    Secondary ENI with a public IP

    A secondary Elastic Network Interface carries a public IP address, widening the network's internet-facing surface (informational).

  • Security

    Security Center on free/basic version only

    Security Center (SAS) is on the free/basic edition, which provides only limited threat detection (no advanced anti-ransomware, virus defense, or deep vulnerability scanning).

  • Security

    Security group open to the world

    Security-group ingress rules that allow a sensitive port (SSH, RDP, common databases) from 0.0.0.0/0.

  • Security

    Stale RAM AccessKey

    Active RAM AccessKeys older than 90 days. Long-lived keys widen the window for leaked credentials to be abused; rotate them regularly.

  • Security

    Tablestore instance public to the internet

    Tablestore (OTS) instances whose network ACL allows INTERNET access, so the instance endpoint is reachable from the public internet.

  • Security

    Tablestore instance without VPC-restricted ACL

    Tablestore (OTS) instances whose network ACL does not restrict access to a VPC, so traffic is not confined to a private network.

  • Security

    Unencrypted cloud disks

    Cloud disks created without encryption at rest. Data on the disk and its snapshots is stored in the clear.

  • Security

    Unhandled Security Center alerts

    Security Center has unhandled suspicious-event alerts that have not been triaged or resolved.

  • Security

    Unhandled Security Center vulnerabilities

    Security Center reports a non-trivial number of unhandled vulnerabilities (e.g. CVEs) that have not yet been remediated.

  • Security

    Unused RAM AccessKey

    Active RAM AccessKeys that are very old (180+ days). Without a last-used signal these are likely forgotten standing credentials.

  • Security

    VPC without flow logs

    A VPC has no active flow log. Without flow logs there is no network traffic record for incident response or anomaly detection.

  • Security

    WAF not enabled for public web assets

    The account exposes public web assets (CDN domains or internet-facing load balancers) but has no Web Application Firewall instance or protected domains configured.

  • Security

    Weak RAM password policy

    The account password policy is below CIS minimums: length under 14, missing character-class complexity, or no maximum password age.

  • Storage

    NAS with no mount targets

    NAS file systems with zero mount targets. Nothing can mount them, yet they keep billing for any stored data.

  • Storage

    Non-prod NAS on Performance tier

    Non-production NAS file systems on the Performance storage tier. The Capacity tier costs a fraction per GB and suits dev/test workloads.

  • Storage

    Non-prod SLS Logstore long retention

    A non-production Logstore retains logs for a very long time. Long retention on throwaway environments pays for storage no one needs.

  • Storage

    OSS Standard bucket is a cold-tier candidate

    OSS buckets on the Standard storage class that were created long ago and have no lifecycle rules. Older Standard data is often cold and a candidate for Infrequent Access or Archive tiering to cut storage cost.

  • Storage

    OSS bucket without lifecycle rules

    OSS buckets with no lifecycle rules, so stale objects and incomplete multipart uploads accumulate and bill indefinitely.

  • Storage

    Old snapshots

    Snapshots older than 180 days. Long-lived snapshots accumulate storage cost; the oldest are rarely the restore point anyone needs.

  • Storage

    Old unused custom images

    Self-owned custom images at least 180 days old that no instance is using. They bill image storage for an image nothing boots from.

  • Storage

    Orphaned snapshots

    Snapshots whose source disk no longer exists and that are at least 30 days old. Their source is gone, so they bill storage for a disk that was deleted.

  • Storage

    Oversized NAS provisioning

    NAS file systems whose billed (metered) size is a tiny fraction of the provisioned capacity. Provisioning likely overshot real demand.

  • Storage

    Previous-generation cloud disks

    In-use cloud disks on a previous-generation category (cloud, cloud_efficiency, cloud_ssd). Migrating to ESSD lowers the per-GB rate with equal or better performance.

  • Storage

    Unattached cloud disks

    Cloud disks in the Available state (no attached instance) for 7+ days. They bill full price whether or not anything uses them.

Checks marked opt-in use a paid or billing-data cloud API and never run unless you switch them on. A default scan uses only free APIs.

How you connect

An AccessKey or a RAM-role STS session

Provide a read-only AccessKey, or assume a RAM role via STS for short-lived credentials.

ReadOnlyAccess. No write permissions, encrypted at rest, revocable any time.

How the dollars are calculated

Curated baseline pricing (live Alibaba pricing is on the roadmap); every finding labels its pricing source.

Every finding is backed by the raw cloud API response it came from, with a confidence score and the pricing source labelled, no black-box numbers.

Scan your Alibaba Cloud estate free

Connect an accesskey or a ram-role sts session and run a read-only scan. Findings come priced in real dollars with a fix and the evidence for each.

Start scanning free

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